University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

2008

Military Reforms with Chinese Characteristics: Informal
Decentralization in the Chinese Government and Its Effect on
Party-Military Relations
Daniel John Hedglin

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation
Hedglin, Daniel John, "Military Reforms with Chinese Characteristics: Informal Decentralization in the
Chinese Government and Its Effect on Party-Military Relations" (2008). Honors Theses. 2345.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2345

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Military Reforms with Chinese Characteristics: Informal Decentralization in the Chinese
Government and Its Effect on Party-Military Relations

By
Daniel John Hedglin

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies and the
Sally-McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
Spring 2008

Approved:

Advisor: Dr. Gang-Guo

w
0 %O’Neil

ReaaW: Dr. Katherine(c

Ids

Reader: DrlQ|^y Rej^

ABSTRACT
DANIEL JOHN HEDGLIN:
Military Reforms with Chinese Characteristics: Informal Decentralization in the Chinese
Government and Its Effect on Party-Military Relations

A study that analyzes party-military relations in the People’s Republic of China during
the 1990s and places this relationship within the context of decentralization.
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Introduction
One point of agreement among those studying both the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)and the People’s Liberation Army(PLA)is that these two organizations have
shared a unique relationship within the Chinese government during the history of the
People’s Republic of China(PRC). Throughout much of the CCP’s history, the party and
the military have been intrinsically linked. During the first decade ofthe PRC,the
military was penetrated on every level by a political system whose main goal was to
ensure military loyalty to the party (Mulvenon,“Two Centers” 6). During the Cultural
Revolution, nearly 50% of the CCP’s Politburo members were uniformed PLA officers,
and the Central Military Commission(CMC)consisted of a substantial portion of
members who were not actively serving in the military (Li,“CMC and Military Policy”
82). In this sense, the military was an institutional and armed instrument ofthe party.
This relationship, however, began to change radically when Deng Xiaoping came to
power in the late 1970s.
During the first two years that Deng controlled the CCP,the party began
reforming every aspect ofthe government, including political, economic, and military
policy. The CCP had to adapt not only to domestic changes but also to changes within
the international order. The socialist economic system established by Mao inhibited
economic growth (Qian 229-230), and military changes throughout the world reflected
the increasing focus on technology over troop levels during war. The party could no
longer utilize the same method it used during the previous thirty years to rule the PRC, let
alone use the system envisioned by Mao Zedong in the early 1920s.
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Although Deng began military reforms in the early 1980s, leadership within the
CCP did not radically alter the party-military relationship until Jiang Zemin came to
power in 1993. Since then, both the CCP and the PLA have undergone significant
transformations. The goal of the party has been to develop economic growth by shifting
from a “revolutionary party” to a “ruling party.” At the same time, the goal of China’s
military transformation has been to develop into a military force that is well equipped to
resolve modern problems. How has the party maintained the delicate balance between
maintaining a military powerful enough to protect China’s internal and external interests
while at the same time maintaining a military that faithfully serves civilian leadership?
The party has attempted to achieve this goal through informal decentralization that
maintains a high level of oversight by the central government.
The military reforms enacted since Jiang Zemin came to power have focused on
delegating administrative and fiscal authority to the military. The goal ofthese reforms
has been to increase the efficiency and stability ofthe military by allowing informed
military leadership rather than party cadres to develop military policy. Although the
party has continued to relinquish limited decision-making authority to the PLA,this has
not led to the party losing, or even loosening, its control over the military. It has enacted
multiple measures, both formal and informal, to ensure oversight by the central
government over the military. Decentralization within the party-military relationship has
not been adopted as an official policy, and many of the reforms lack institutional
framework. This lack of framework allows for the party to regain quickly relinquished
powers to the military when it does not agree with military leadership. While
decentralizing decision-making authority to the military, the party has used both
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preexisting strategies and new ones to strengthen government oversight of the military.
Overall, these military reforms fit within the overall adaptive strategy that the CCP has
followed over the past three decades rather than, as current literature on the Chinese
military suggests, being limited to the party-military relationship.
Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has redefined the partymilitary relationship through decentralization. In the first chapter, I will discuss the four
major events that led to the military reforms in the 1990s. In the second chapter, I will
examine the party-military reforms and their relationship with decentralization. In the
third chapter, I will examine the methods the Chinese government has used to ensure
party (civilian) control over the military during these reforms. Finally, I will examine
both the positive and negative consequences of the decentralization without
institutionalization for both the party and the military.
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Chapter 1
The Era of Deng Xiaoping: The Seeds of Transformation in the PartvMiiitarv Relationship
Military reforms had been taking place throughout China since the late 1970s, yet
they increased substantially in the early 1990s. In this chapter, I will describe the four
major events that led to the significant transformation through decentralization ofthe
party-military relationship.
History
The Third Plenum ofthe Eleventh Central Committee in 1978 marked a major
turning point in the Chinese political system. This was the first major meeting ofthe
CCP after Deng Xiaoping had consolidated power of the party after Mao’s death in 1976.
This meeting was the beginning of wide-ranging economic, political, and military
reforms that would significantly change the Chinese government.
One of the goals of the post-1978 military reforms was to increase the military’s
ability to fight a modern war through increased professionalization(Godwin 89). From
the establishment of the PRC until the era of Deng Xiaoping (1949-1993), the nature of
war underwent significant changes(Godwin 89-108). During the early 1970s, the
Chinese military strategy was highly influenced by the Vietnam War and focused on
fighting a “war of attrition.” In the late 1970s, the Chinese military set its sights on the
USSR and developing its nuclear arsenal to deter a Soviet attack. The PLA’s strategy
changed once again in 1985, when the Chinese military began to focus on fighting a
“local war,” which called for developing a smaller yet more efficient military (Blasko
54).
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Although Deng promoted military modernization as one of his “four
modernizations,” the Chinese military budget did not reflect military modernization’s
importance. Although the Chinese military was allowed to develop its own defense
industry to supplement income beginning in 1985,the Chinese military simply did not
have the resources to undergo a massive transformation(Godwin 97). This would all
change towards the end ofthe 1980s. At this time, four major events occurred that would
lead to military reforms: the rapid economic growth of the 1980s, the transition of power
to a civilian-led government, the Tiananmen Square incident, and the Persian Gulf War.
These events not only gave the PRC the fiscal ability to undergo reforms, but also they
highlighted the need to radically transform the party-military relationship.
Rapid Economic Growth
Economic growth was one of Deng Xiaoping’s major goals. Although Deng
Figure 1.1
Real and Nominal Changes in PLA Budgets, 1978-2003
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committed to military modernization, this type of reform was a lower priority than
economic and industrial development(Gill 155). As a result, the PLA’s budget increased
little during
the 1980s. As can be see in Figure 1.1 on the previous page, while the military budget
nominally increased eight out of ten years during the 1980s, these budget increases were
outpaced by inflation every year. It is not until the 1990s that there are net gains for
military expenditure in real terms. The military essentially underwent budget cuts
throughout during this time. Budget constraints severely limited the Chinese military’s
ability to modernize.
Strong economic growth during the 1980s, however, allowed for increased
funding of military modernization. Figure 1.2 shows that China’s GDP growth rate in the
1980s averaged just above 10 percent, giving the country a strong economic base for
military reforms. China’s economic success led to military budget increases.
Figure 1.2
China’s GDP Growth Rate, 1978-1992

Source: World Development Index 2004
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Transition to Civilian-Led Government
During the late 1980s, the Chinese government underwent a significant political
transition in response to both domestic and international pressures. Domestically, the
CCP gradually transitioned from being a “revolutionary party” to a “ruling party” as
China transformed into an economic power. This fundamental shift within the party
necessitated a transformation in party leadership. Instead of being led by party cadres
with military experience, the party was increasingly being led by “technocrats,”
politicians who were intensely trained in engineering or economics and whose focus was
on national planning. Since these leaders had little to no military experience, they did not
possess the same personal authority to control the military that both Mao and Deng
possessed. This transformation in party leadership set the stage for a change in the partymilitary relationship, a change where a civilian government would be able to maintain
authority over the military.
Internationally, the global political stage also changed drastically in the late
1980s. Communist regimes collapsed around the world. Chinese leadership recognized
this shift in global politics, and thus began to adapt the CCP’s rule in order to stay in
power. The military was an area that would be extremely affected by these changes.
Tiananmen Square Incident
During late 1980s, Chinese college students and intellectuals became dissatisfied
with many aspects of the Chinese government, particularly high levels of corruption
within the government. In the spring of 1989, hundreds of thousands ofthese students
descended on Tiananmen Square to protest the government. On June 4, 1989, PLA tanks
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by order of the CCP rolled into Tiananmen Square and violently ended the student protest
that had engulfed Beijing for several months. The Chinese military’s use offeree on the
protesters brought both international and domestic condemnation; the Tiananmen Square
incident was the largest political crisis in the PRC since the death of Mao. The
aftershock of these events affected every aspect ofthe Chinese government, particularly
party-military relations.
The most significant effect of these protests and subsequent repression was a re
politicization of the military. Political indoctrination within the military increased
significantly during the three years after the Tiananmen Square incident(Shambaugh,
“Party-Army” 17). This was a result of Deng Xiaoping’s fear of military insubordination
to the party. Deng aimed to increase the party’s control over the military through
increasing political indoctrination. Along with the re-politicization ofthe military, there
was an increase of the military’s influence on the party. During the Tiananmen Square
incident, the CCP party leaders, particularly Deng Xiaoping, worked against the
professionalization that had developed within the military for the previous ten years.
This event was a major test for military loyalty to the ruling party. Although there
were some accounts of insubordination, the military deferred to the party’s leadership
during this crisis. Many contemporary Chinese scholars, however, began to question
whether the military would once again protect the ruling party from civil unrest if it
occurred.* Although the military had deferred to the party’s decision-making authority,
many military leaders did so grudgingly. The fear of military insubordination led the
Chinese leadership to realize the need for a new relationship between the party and the

For example, see Larry Woertzel’s “The Tiananmen Massacre Reappraised: Public
Protest, Urban Warfare, and the People’s Liberation Army.”

9

military, one where the military was more professionalized and played little role in
domestic policy within China.
Persian Gulf War
The Persian Gulf War was also a significant turning point in party-military
relations. First and foremost, this war showed Chinese military leadership that, in regards
to military technology, they were lagging significantly behind the United States
(Mulvenon et al 10). This war was also significant in that the weapons used by the Iraqis
were mainly purchased from China,further highlighting the inadequacies of Chinese
weaponry (Shichor 209).
The Persian Gulf War caused the leadership within the Chinese military to rethink
its military strategy. They no longer looked at “major war

as being the main threat to

China. Instead, the Chinese military began focusing on the strategy of“local war,” where
the Chinese would fight the enemy on smaller battlefields. The United Nations’ victory
also showed the importance of military professionalization and technology. In the
Persian Gulf War, the high-tech weaponry possessed by the United States’ army rather
than the number of troops led to victory. Chinese leadership recognized that their army
of over four million soldiers that did not possess modem technology that would allow the
military to protect the Chinese government’s interests adequately in a modem war
(Shichor 209-213). From this point on, the Chinese military would focus on developing
“elite troops” that were highly trained and well-equipped in order to protect China.
During this time, military modernization also focused on protecting China’s
economic and political interests. During the 1980s, Chinese economic interests moved
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A war that included the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
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from China’s northeast and interior to the east coast. Also, leadership on Taiwan began
moving towards independence. The Chinese government needed an army that would be
able to protect its economic base, project regional force, and deter its foreign enemies
(particularly the United States) from intervening in the Chinese sphere of influence.
This drastic shift in military policy would have been difficult to achieve without
significant military reforms. Instead of political indoctrination, military leaders needed to
shift their focus to developing effective military strategies (Joffe, “Trends and CounterTrends” 42). This would require not only a separation ofthe party and the military, but
also an area of relative autonomy that would allow for the military to have decision
making authority on military policy.
Overview
These four major events would set the stage for transforming the Chinese
military. Over the next twenty years, the Chinese government would redefine the partymilitary relationship by delegating decision-making on defense issues to the military and
strengthening civilian control over the military. In the next chapter, I will discuss why
the CCP and the PLA chose decentralization as a method to increase both the PLA’s level
of professionalization and modernization.
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Chapter 2;
The Era of Jiang Zemin Part 1: Decentralization and its Effects on the
Chinese Government
One of the most important reforms that has occurred since the death of Mao
Zedong is decentralization in the Chinese government. Decentralization had its roots in
the era of Deng Xiaoping, yet it became an increasingly effective way for the party to
maintain control of the government after the four events mentioned in the previous
chapter (White and Smoke 4). The reforms undertaken during the era of Jiang Zemin are
not at odds with Deng Xiaoping’s goal of transforming China into a modern nation.
Instead, they represent a deepening of these reforms. Although decentralization has not
been adopted as one of the CCP’s official guiding policies, its influence can be seen
throughout Chinese government, particularly in the military.
For the sake of this thesis, decentralization will be defined as the movement to
allow for relative autonomy and jurisdictional distinctions, where subnational entities are
responsible for day-to-day administration of specific tasks(Shambaugh,“Party Army or
National Army?” 19). Rather than focusing on the relationship between the central
government and subnational entities such as local governments, the definition of
decentralization used in this chapter will focus on two major characteristics of
decentralization: the vertical relationship between governmental entities and delegation
of decision-making authority to the entities on lower side of this relationship. In this
chapter, I will discuss the effects of this type of decentralization within the Chinese
government, particularly focusing on its effect on the party-military relationship.
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Decentralization in China
Decentralization is a broad term often used to describe the transfer of powers
from the central government to subnational entities. Because of the varying nature of this
governmental transformation, the term “decentralization” is used to describe separate
processes with the same goal: increasing decision-making at subnational levels of
government. The rational explanation of this process is that subnational leaders have the
advantage of information, thus allowing them to make better and more effective
decisions. With regard to the PRC,there is a growing body of literature debating the
nature, and even the existence, of decentralization within the government. According to
Ronald White and Paul Smoke, a majority ofintergovernmental reforms enacted within
the past thirty years “have been mainly toward greater local autonomy (7),” a strong
indicator of decentralization. Although China has undergone significant political and
economic reforms over the past three decades, decentralization has not been officially
adopted as a policy within the central government(White and Smoke 7). In spite of the
reforms that have empowered decision-making at subnational levels, governmental
oversight within the PRC remains very much centralized at the highest levels. These
contradictory situations cause experts to debate the extent to which decentralization is
taking place within China.
There are multiple incentives for undergoing decentralization. Governments often
decentralize decision-making to encourage governmental transparency and accountability
in order to increase the legitimacy of the state (Kaiser 313). Political leaders in many
countries also champion decentralization as a system that strengthens the relationship
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Table 2.1.
Provincial Leadership Experience of Full Members of the 1992, 1997,2002, and
2007 Politburos

tE

14 Politburo(20 Members)
15^'^ Politburo(22 Members)
16“^ Politburo(24 Members)
17^*^ Politburo(25 Members)

As High
Provincial Leaders^
No.
%
11
55.0
15
68.2
20
83.3
22
88.0

As Top Provincial
Chiefs"
No. %
10 50.0
13 59.1
16 66.7
18 72.0

Source: China^s Deep Reform,92

between a state and its citizens through empowering locally elected leaders. There is
little evidence, however, to support the idea that these factors embody decentralization as
seen in the PRC. The goal of reforms undertaken within the past three decades has not
been to empower the lower levels of Chinese government. Rather, the reforms aim to
increase the efficiency and stability of the CCP. Leadership within the Chinese
government is aiming to improve the quality of leadership at subnational levels; not only
because they wish to develop a government that is able to adapt easily to local situations.
but also for its own political purposes. Strong local governments reflect well on the
party, and leadership at provincial levels has become an important stepping-stone to
positions in the central government(Li and White 92). As can be seen in Table 2.1, the
number of leaders in the Politburo with leadership at the provincial level has increased
significantly over the past two decades.
Although this describes the goal of decentralization, there are several different
methods of undergoing this transformation. Table 2.2 on the next page presents the three
principal methods of decentralization: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution
(Kaiser 317). Each of these methods has unique characteristics that contain

^ High province-level leaders are the deputy party secretaries, vice governors, or above.
Top provincial chiefs refer to the party secretaries and governors only.
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Table 2.2
Types of Decentralization
Responsibility

Accountability

Deconcentration

The dispersion of the responsibility
for certain services to regional
branch offices.

Accountability remains
largely top-down within
administration; many
theoretical benefits of
decentralization may be
more limited, but risks may
be lower

Delegation

The transfer of responsibility for
decision-making and the
administration of public functions
to local governments or
semiautonomous organizations not
wholly controlled by the central
government, but ultimately
accountable to it.

Assignment of a specific task
or function may make use of
great local information and
downward accountability,
but decentralized entities are
restricted in prioritizing
across functions or across
sectors

Devolution

The authority for decision-making,
finance, and management is
transferred to quasi-autonomous
units of local government.

There is greater emphasis on
bottom-up institutions of
political autonomy.

Source: Kai Kaiser,^‘Decentralization Reforms”

significant advantages and disadvantages. Deconcentration refers to decentralization of
central government ministries whereby subnational governments act as agents of the
center
(White and Smoke 6). Many ofthe theoretical benefits of deconcentration may be
limited because there is a meager level of decision making at lower levels, yet the central
government maintains a high level of authority and oversight while gaining an increased
level of efficiency at the lower levels of government. Under delegation, subnational
governments rather than branches ofthe central government are responsible for
delivering certain services. This type of decentralization allows for a level of relative
autonomy for subnational governmental entities in day-to-day administration while
maintaining top-down accountability. Unlike deconcentration and delegation, devolution
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grants a significant amount of administrative authority to local governments. According
to Bahl, this is the “most complete form of decentralization (Bahl 14).” In this form of
decentralization, the central and local governments work more as partners in a horizontal
relationship rather than in the vertical relationship seen in both delegation and
deconcentration. This form of decentralization is often highly institutionalized. Although
devolution offers the greatest level of local decision-making and high level of efficiency,
it calls for a highly institutional decentralization of power from the central government to
subnational governments.
These three types of decentralization can be analyzed in three dimensions: fiscal,
administrative, and political dimensions. Fiscal decentralization includes the degree to
which revenue raising and spending authority is placed on lower levels of government.
Administrative decentralization includes the ability of subnational units to administer
matters that have been delegated to them (Kaiser 319). Political decentralization includes
the extent of actual power and political accountability that are passed along from the
central government. Examining the three dimensions of decentralization allows one to
better understand the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of decentralization.
Under deconcentration, local governments gain limited fiscal, administrative, and
political authority. Under delegation, subnational entities gain a high level of
administrative authority, yet fiscal and political authority is not assured. Devolution,
however, bestows fiscal, administrative, and political authority upon subnational
governments.
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Decentralization with Chinese Characteristics
Over the past two decades, decentralization has increasingly taken place
throughout East Asia. These East Asian governments have incorporated various elements
of each of these types of decentralization to pass authority to subnational levels(White
and Smoke 6). China is not an exception to this rule. Although deconcentration exists in
small amounts within the Chinese government, a majority ofthe decentralization that has
taken place has been delegation. Many of the economic and political reforms that have
taken place within the PRC have increased the administrative and fiscal responsibility of
the provincial governments. Because there is only one official ruling party, there are low
levels of party competition throughout the government. Because they are all within the
same party, officials within the central government can trust that local leaders will obey
orders when necessary. This level of trust has allowed for the growth of administrative
power at the provincial level(White and Smoke 8), thus creating an area of limited
autonomy for subnational entities with the central government maintaining a high level of
political oversight. With the exception of the creation of local elections, there is little
evidence that suggests extensive devolution is taking place throughout China. Although
the PRC’s relationship with Hong Kong and Macao can be interpreted as a form of
devolution because the central government has relinquished power to subnational entities,
it is more accurately described as the central government working to incorporate
“foreign” entities rather than domestic decentralization.^

^ This is because the governments of these special administrative regions developed
independently of the Chinese government. The governments of these entities have a very
high level of political, fiscal, and administrative authority, and they have a very weak
relationship with the Chinese central government.
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As stated above, there are multiple examples of delegation within the Chinese
government. The most prominent ofthese include the creation ofthe household
responsibility system and the special economic zones. Both ofthese cases illustrate “topdown” decentralization. Although these reforms granted specific powers to subnational
levels of the government, leaders on the lower levels of government remain directly
responsible to the national leadership. These reforms have been championed as
empowering local leaders, but “central authorities had little trouble removing regional
leaders [when they disagree] on many occasions(Cai and Treisman 10).
Current discussion of decentralization within the PRC has centered on economic
growth, legislative authority, and the power to tax.^ Many signs indicate, however, that
the decentralization currently taking place also applies to reforms ofthe party-military
relationship. Delegation has been at the heart ofthe reforms in the PRC. As noted by
David Shambaugh, there are few indications of political indoctrination within the ranks
of the PLA,and military leadership is given authority to dictate training and other
professional activities(Shambaugh,“China’s New High Command”). Although the PLA
has been forced out of the defense industry, military leaders have a high level offinancial
authority with regard to their budget. The CMC General Office, a military-led
organization under the CMC,has gained influence on developing military policy (Li,
CMC and Military Policy” 76).
Structural and political factors have brought about decentralization in China. The
separation of leadership that has occurred within party-military relationship shares the

^ For more information, see Hongbin Cai and Daniel Tresiman’s “Did Government
Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle?” and Xiao Zhao’s
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same factors. The most striking similarity between these reforms is their common goal.
First and foremost, both ofthese reforms wish to promote governmental efficiency and
stability by placing highly qualified experts in positions of authority rather than
committed party cadres. Much like the central government decentralized to improve its
efficiency, the party needed to review its structural relationship with the military to
modernize. Although there is debate to the actual effectiveness of delegative
decentralization in the economic and legislative sphere (Cai and Treisman 1), it has
served as an effective method to control subnational units of government. Leadership
within the CCP hopes that allowing the military to have an area of relative authority will
be an effective way to “control the gun” while allowing the military to continue
modernization. Although the central government has delegated specific powers to
subnational entities, it has yet to strongly institutionalize them, leaving little legal
framework for these reforms(White and Smoke 7).
Another common characteristic between the decentralization within the Chinese
government and the party-military reforms is the method of decentralization. Delegation
brought about political, economic, and military reforms; the party is currently creating an
area of relative autonomy with a high level of oversight by the central government for the
military. Why would the military use delegation? It allows for the central government to
maintain a high level of oversight over local governments as responsibility for the
development of economic and administrative policy is passed to subnational entities.
Additionally, a high level of institutionalization is not necessary for this type of
decentralization. Unlike delegation, devolution calls for a high level of
institutionalization, which could limit the central government’s ultimate authority over
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the military. It also requires a large amount of accountability from both lower and upper
levels. Although the reforms that have dictated changes within party-military relations
can be considered decentralization, the military itself remains an entity that maintains a
strict level of top-dovm authority. Thus, devolution would not serve the central
government well. Deconcentration calls for the local government to serve as an
extension of the central government. Because one of the primary goals of the partymilitary reforms is to remove politics from the military, this sort of reform would work
against this goal.
Finally, the decentralization that has occurred in the political, economic, and
military sectors are similar because they still maintain a low level of institutionalization,
meaning that the central government is without constitutional restraint to control every
aspect of government. The central government has granted subnational entities varying
degrees of temporary political, fiscal, and administrative authority, yet the central
government can retract these powers.^ Complete institutionalization would significantly
decrease the authority of the central government by limiting the central government’s
ability to recentralize power. Many ofthe reforms that have led to defacto
decentralization come from the national government rather than from lower levels ofthe
government. Thus, the decision-making authority granted by reforms to the subnational
entities is not absolute, as ultimate authority still remains with the central government.
The low level of institutionalization has also led to an asymmetrical decentralization,
with different subnational entities having different levels of fiscal, administrative, and

^ The central government’s ability to retract powers from local governments has been
apparent in relation to political authority, particularly regarding legislative powers. For
more information, see
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political authority (Kaiser 320). Although this system of asymmetrical decentralization
may allow for the government to be responsive to local problems, it may be difficult for
the government to maintain.
Although the decentralization within the Chinese government and within partymilitary relations shares many common characteristics, the decentralization that occurred
within the military presents unique challenges for the central government. Political
decentralization is often characterized by gaining greater local autonomy and “bottom
up” oversight, yet this has yet to take place within China. This sort of change would not
be expected within the military because it relies on top-down authority to maintain order.
Although informal decentralization has been taking place throughout China,
decentralization has not taken place within the military. Also, decentralization often
refers to the relationship between the central government and local governments. The
decentralization that has taken place within the party-military relationship is also unique
because the military is not necessarily a “subnational” entity. The military maintains a
presence in the central government through the CMC. Therefore, the party-military
reforms resemble decentralization in that they create a vertical power relationship. Much
like the vertical relationship between the central government and local governments,
decentralization has led to a vertical relationship between the party and the military. The
party maintains its position at the top of this relationship, with the military remaining
below.
Military modernization is a rigorous process that requires many pre-requisites,
most important of which are stability and informed leadership (Blasko 69). The reforms
necessary to achieve a high level of modernization and professionalization would be
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difficult to achieve within the framework of the party-military system establish by Mao
Zedong that called for a close relationship between the party and the military. Unlike
modem China, leaders during the Maoist era performed both political and military
functions. This has led the Chinese government to simultaneously pursue
decentralization along with a shift to civil-military leadership to effectively control the
military. The Chinese government has always championed economic growth over
military modernization (Blasko 68). The system of political and economic
decentralization that was instituted during the 1980s served as a model for the military
professionalization that has taken place over the past two decades. In this way,the
professionalization that has taken place within the PLA is an extension of the
decentralization that has taken place throughout the Chinese government.
The professionalization that has taken place within the PRC over the past two
decades certainly includes modernizing the military and updating the training that the
average soldier receives, yet these changes were reliant on the relative stability that was
brought about by the military reforms. Much like economic growth was spurred through
leadership by “technocrats” rather than party cadres who abided by political ideology,
military modernization has taken place through leaders that have strong military
backgrounds rather than party cadres.
The goals ofthe military reforms are very clear. The army has sought greater
autonomy from party control to better pursue professional missions, whereas the
government has attempted to increase its jurisdictional control over the military while
encouraging it to modernize(Shambaugh,“Party-Army or National Military” 19-20).
What is unique to the decentralization that has occurred within party-military relations is
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that the party is strengthening political control over the military. Over the past two
decades, China has passed twelve defense and army-building laws that guides the
military.^ These recent reforms have clarified the realms within which military leaders
have authority. By doing this, the government is not only defining its control over the
military, but also defining its leadership role within the country. By examining the partymilitary relations in this light, one can better understand that the party is also continuing
to redefine itself through the delegation, a way that has already taken place within the
political and economic sectors.
Overview
Much like the relationship between leaders in the central government and in lower
levels of government has changed,the relationship between the government and the
military has changed significantly. Leaders in subnational entities, which include
provincial governments and the military, have gained significant decision-making ability,
yet the central government still maintains significant oversight authority. Much like local
leaders who have been delegated powers by the central government, military leaders have
the advantage of information in terms ofthe military to make informed decisions that will
increase modernization. As long as the party is able to maintain control over the military,
the party will be fully justified in delegating this decision-making authority to military
leaders by achieving the theoretical benefits of decentralization.

^ Included in this are the National Defense Law of the PRC, Military Service Law ofthe
PRC, Military Facilities Protection Law of the PRC, Civil Air Defense Law of the PRC,
Law on the Reserve Officers of the PRC,the Garrison Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the PRC, Military Service Regulations Pertaining to PLA
Officers in Active Service, and Regulations on the Military Ranks ofPLA Officers. For
a further discussion, see the section of China White Papers entitled, “China’s National
Defense.”
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The most important challenge that the Chinese government faces as it undergoes
decentralization is maintaining “top-down” accountability. How does the central
government maintain oversight as it relinquishes decision-making to subnational entities?
This is particularly crucial between the central government and the military. In the next
chapter, 1 will discuss how the central government(which now consists primarily of
leaders without military experience) has maintained control over the military.
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Chapter 3:
The Era of Jiang Zemin Part 2: Methods of Maintaining Oversight
Over the Military by Chinese Central Government
As the central government delegates fiscal and administrative authority to the
subnational entities, it has also been taking measure to strengthen its oversight ability.
These measures, although on the surface they centralized power, are necessary to
undertake decentralization successfully. Without strengthening the central government’s
authority over subnational entities, the central government would be unable to maintain
downward accountability. This would allow for subnational entities could gain too much
power, thus limiting the central government’s ability to direct policy.
This challenge is particularly important in regards to transforming the partymilitary relationship. Technocrats control the party, yet the party maintains control ofthe
military. How has the party been able to maintain oversight over the military?
Decentralization in the Chinese government has not led to the CCP losing, or even
loosening, its control over the military. The party has used various methods to ensure
civilian control over the military. These methods range from preexisting strategies, such
as strengthening personal relationships between the party and military leadership, to new
strategies, which includes removing the military from the business sector. The common
thread behind all of the methods of ensuring central oversight that has allowed for
delegative decentralization to be successful is that they are all highly informal, meaning
that they are not official goals as listed by the party and they consist of little legal
framework. In this chapter, I will examine these methods the party has used to ensure
civilian control over the military.
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Civilian Control Over the Military
Civilian control is essential to achieving delegative decentralization in the PRC.
Although the Chinese government has passed significant legislation that defines both the
role of the military and the party, informal methods have also played a significant role in
ensuring civilian control. The most important methods are developing personal loyalties.
shuffling the membership of the CMC,and undergoing budgetary reforms.
Personal Loyalties
Throughout Chinese history, personal relationships (jguanxi) have played a
significant role in politics(Scobell,“Creeping Guojiahua^'^ 229). Personal loyalties have
played a crucial role in ensuring civilian control over the military. The importance of
personal relationships manifested itself in the transition of power from Deng Xiaoping to
Jiang Zemin.
Due to his lack of military experience, Jiang Zemin did not possess the same level
of personal authority that enabled Mao and Deng to maintain control over the military
(Joffe,“The Future ofPLA Modernization” 368). Without Deng Xiaoping’s personal
approval, Jiang Zemin would have had a difficult time gaining control over the military’s
leadership (Joffe, “Trends and Counter-Trends” 31). Therefore, Jiang spent much of his
first two years as the leader of the CCP securing key political allies within the PLA by
adopting pro-military positions on issues that are of key concern to the PLA, particularly
military modernization and foreign policy (Shambaugh,“Pinnacle of the Pyramid” 110).
In order to build a loyal group offollowers within the military, Jiang also shuffled the

26

membership of the CMC three times during his first three years in power.^ Additionally,
he personally promoted more than fifty generals to the rank offull general during his two
terms as the president ofthe PRC(Shambaugh,“Pinnacle of the Pyramid” 110), thus
ensuring their loyalty to him. During his two terms as the leader ofthe PRC,Jiang never
lost sight of the importance of personal relationships in maintaining civilian control.
Much like his predecessor, Hu Jintao spent three years serving on the CMC before
he assumed the top position of the party and the state. Since he also had no previous
military experience, these three years allowed him to enhance his legitimacy as a leader
of the military and also allowed him to create personal relationships with the leadership
of the military.
Although Hu spent several years on the CMC before he ascended to the top
position in both the party and the state, neither of his two “heir apparents”(Xi Jinping or
Li Keqiang) have been named to the current CMC(CRS Report). If either ofthese two
politicians becomes the leader of the PRC,how will he handle his relationship with the
military? Will Hu relinquish his position as the leader ofthe CMC after he steps down as
the leader of the state? It is still too early to predict this.
Reorganization of the CMC
In addition to developing personal relationships within the CMC,Jiang Zemin
reorganized the structure ofthe CMC in order to increase civilian control over the
military. From 1954 until 1992,the party appointed a vice chair and a secretary general
who were responsible for the daily affairs of the CMC. This arrangement, however,
allowed generals to gain considerable power over the committee. From 1989 to 1992,

^ For a more thorough explanation ofthis, see David Shambaugh,“China’s Military in
Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection.”
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Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing,two high-ranking military officials, held these two
positions. Deng feared that after his resignation these two leaders would gain too much
power over Jiang, thus limiting the influence ofthe CCP (Mulvenon,“Two Centers” 14).
Shortly after gaining power, Jiang (with the assistance of Deng)forced these two veteran
CMC leaders, who Deng felt had become “overly powerful and ambitious,” to retire
(Joffe,“Trends and Counter-Trends” 31). This ensured that the civilian chairman, Jiang
Zemin, was the unquestioned leader ofthe committee.
Much like the personal relations on the committee, this method used to ensure
civilian control over the government is informal and lacks institutionalization. Rather
than being eliminated, these two positions have been vacant since the two Yangs were
purged from the committee.
Budgetary Reforms
In 1985, Deng Xiaoping increased the military’s ability to develop its defense
industry in order to supplement decreasing budgets, but these reforms produced mixed
results. Although the income received through the defense industry increased the budget
of the military, it was brought increased corruption within the military^® and a decrease of
the military’s dependence on the party (Shambaugh,“China’s Military in Transition” 12).
This may have been acceptable when Deng, who had a close relationship with the PLA’s
leadership, was in power, but CCP leadership recognized the need for reform when Jiang
Zemin came to power.
During his time in power, Jiang led reforms that removed the military from the
business sector. Although the official stance ofthe Chinese government has been that the

Included are smuggling, real estate speculation, and prostitution rings.
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aim of these reforms was to eliminate the corruptive forces of capitalism from the
military,'' these reforms also have the added benefit of ensuring the military’s reliance on
the civilian leadership. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, defense spending has increased
significantly in China since the removal of the military’s business interest. Much like the
party’s dependence on personal loyalties and wording used in legislation, this form of
ensuring civilian control ofthe military is very informal.
This form of civilian control over the military has yet to be tested. Although the
CCP has successfully removed the military’s extra-budgetary revenue, it has significantly
raised
Figure 3.1
Official Defense Budget in Constant 2002 Renminbi, 1978-2004
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the military’s budget every year. The civilian government has yet to decrease military
funding in favor of other government programs. Therefore, it is very difficult to measure
the effectiveness of this form civilian control over the military. Only after the party
significantly decreases the defense budget will we know whether the military will
continue to comply with the party’s leadership.
Party-MUitary to Civil-Military
Another method to ensure long-term civilian control over the military is to shift
responsibility for the military from the party to the state. This system is in sharp contrast
to the military’s relationship with the party during the early years ofthe PRC. During
this time, the party and the state were intrinsically linked. Therefore, the party-state
referred to the “party-state” as a single entity. Since Deng Xiaoping came to power, the
central government has brought about a separation between the party and the state. The
goal of these reforms has been to allow for the two entities to possess separate
responsibilities. The party’s responsibility is to guide policy decisions, whereas the
state’s responsibility is to administer and implement these policies(Scobell,“Creeping
Guojiahud' 233). These reforms have increasingly stressed “rule by law” within China,
thus increasing the state’s oversight ability. This sort oftransformation has been taking
place throughout every aspect of the Chinese government, including the military.
The successes and failures ofthe party-state reforms are reflected within partymilitary relations. During the Mao era, the relationship between the party and army was
very close. The army was created and led by the party; therefore, the military was
obligated to subordinate itself to the party rather than the state (Allen 10-13). Top
political officials during this time often gained legitimacy through their military
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experience (Shambaugh,“Military in Transition” 15). This relationship began to change
after Deng came to power. Along with the development of party-state reforms,
responsibility for the military increasingly has shifted from the party to the state. The
rational for this transformation also has roots in Deng’s philosophy on the different
responsibilities of the party and the state. As the military gained greater administrative
and fiscal authority, the party no longer needed to guide military policy. The state.
however, gained more responsibility as it continued to administer and oversee the
military. In addition, many generals within the army still have high positions within the
party, but they do not have an official position within the civilian government. This
method allows the current generation of technocrats to maintain control ofthe state by
removing the military’s ability to interfere with state business.
Legislation Regulating the Military
During the 1990s, there was an extensive amount of legislation related to military
reformation. Although the primary goal of this legislation was to promote modernization.
it shifted control ofthe military from the party to the state. According to Andrew
Scobell,“many of these [reforms] have increased the web of ties between the PLA and
the PRC with little attention to the CCP (Scobell,“Creeping Guojiahua'' 223).”
This emphasis on the military’s subordination to the state is particularly evident in
the National Defense Law,the most significant piece of party-military legislation in the
post-Deng era. Unlike previous legislation that emphasized the military’s responsibility
to the party, this law recognizes the military’s subordination to the state. Within this
legislation, the term for state {guojia) is used rather than the term for party. The term
state” {guojia) is mentioned over 40 times in the law, whereas there is only a single
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reference to the relationship between the military and the party. In addition, specific state
institutions such as the National People’s Congress are mentioned rather than their
counterparts in the CCP. Since the development of the National Defense Law,
subsequent legislation has used the term for “state” rather than “party” when referring to
12

China’s central government.

Although there has been a shift from “party-military” relations to “civil-military”
relations, several factors have prevented this goal from being realized. Although the
importance of shift to civil-military relations can be seen in the wording ofimportant
military legislation (since the passage of the National Defense Law, all major legislation
regarding the military has referred to the PLA’s subservience to the state rather than the
party), this transformation has not been officially recognized as a policy of the central
government. These reforms continue be enacted through informal means rather than
established legal framework. Additionally, the relationship between the state and the
party remains very close. Currently, the membership of both the party’s CMC and the
state’s CMC are the same, essentially making them parallel entities. Therefore, the
difference between the military being a “party-military” or a “civil-military” remains
small.
Although responsibility for the military has technically shifted from the party to
the state, the party maintains leadership over the military through its tight control of the
state. No other parties or groups are allowed to dictate affairs ofthe army (Allen 24),
thus ensuring CCP guidance of the PLA.

12

For further discussion, see David Shambaugh’s “Civil-Military Relations in China:
Party-Army or National Military?”
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Overview
As can be seen in this chapter, the methods that have been used to ensure civilian
oversight over the military have been, on a whole, very informal. Personal relationships
and the restructuring of the CMC have been effective, yet they remain to be strongly
institutionalized. Budgetary reforms ensure that the military does not have access to
income from outside of the government, yet the civilian leadership in the central
government has yet to challenge the military’s budget needs. Finally, edthough
legislation passed throughout the 1990s shows that the central government is shifting
control of the military from the party to the state, this has yet to be adopted as an official
policy of the central government. Although the nationalization (guojiahua) of the
military could be a sign of institutionalization within the party-military relationship, it is
still too early to determine whether nationalization will have this effect. Although
Chinese leadership has started to nationalize military, it still uses informal methods to
achieve this goal. In the next chapter, I will examine the successes and failures of not
only decentralization within the context of the military but also the methods used to
ensure civilian control over the military.
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Chapter 4:
Hu Jintao and Beyond: Consequences of Decentralization
Significant reforms that dictate party-military relations have been enacted since
the early 1990s, so it is possible to examine the effectiveness of these reforms. Has the
decentralization within the party-military relationship allowed for an increased efficiency
and stability of the military? Have these reforms allowed for successful military
modernization? In regard to oversight authority, has the civilian government maintained
effective control over the military? In this chapter, I will examine both the positive and
negative effects of the informal decentralization.
Successes of the Reforms
Stability in the PLA’s leadership has been one of the most prominent benefits of
the decentralization that has occurred within the military. Although it is still difficult to
predict the future high leadership ofthe military, a majority ofthe military’s top officials
have gained their position through their expertise and experience rather than their
position in the CCP. While personal relationships(guanxi) cannot be fiilly discounted as
a factor in the promotion process, its importance has been waning since Jiang Zemin
became the leader of the party and the state (Scobell and Wortzel,“Elites, Institutes and
Ideas” 3). A leader’s military experience has taken the place of personal relationships in
regard to promotions within the military. According to David Shambaugh,“upward
mobility in the military is progressively becoming more defined, predictable, and
professional (Shambaugh,“China’s New High Command”).” He was able to reach this
conclusion by studying military leadership through the past three decades. Unlike twenty
years ago, current military leaders
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Table 4.1
CPC and PRC Central Military Commissions as of April 2008
Name
Other Positions Held:
Chairman:

Hu Jintao

Vice chairmen:

Guo Boxiong
Xu Caihou^"^

Politburo
Politburo

Members:

Chang Wanquan
Chen Bingde
Jing Zhiyuan
Li Jinai

Commander, Shenyang Military Command
Chief genered staff, PLA General Staff Dept.
Commander, 2"^ Artillery Corps.
Director, PLA General Political Dept.
Min nat’l def; state councilor
Director,PLA Logistics Dept.
Commander,PLA Air Force

CPC general secretary; PRC president
TT

Liang Guanglie
Liao Xilong
Xu Qiliang
Source: China Vitae

very rarely “helicopter” to the top of their profession. This is a sign of increased stability
with the leadership of the PLA,thus making the military reforms successful in this area.
Table 4.1 shows that with the exception of Hu Jintao, all of the other leaders have
significant military backgrounds. This shows the importance of experience within the
military.
Membership on the CMC has also stabilized through the reforms. Since Jiang
Zemin came to power,the position of chairman has been a civilian (although not
necessarily the leader of the party). Leaders from the four main branches of the military
also have held positions on the council.*^ The current leadership ofthe CMC reflects the
transition that is occurring within the current generation. The generals are strikingly
different from previous generals on the CMC. They are younger, better educated, and
less involved in day-to-day national politics than their predecessors. The ability of a
13

Has an extensive military background. He currently holds military rank of General.
Also holds military rank of General.
15
Currently, the leader of the PLA Navy is not represented on the CMC. This is because
the former leader of the military died late 2007 and has not been replaced.
14
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civilian to lead this committee that otherwise consists of well-trained military officials
shows that civilian control over the military is growing in strength.
There also has been limited success in removing the military from politics.
Although the military still has a presence on other levels of the central government such
as the National People’s Congress(NPC),there is not a member ofthe Politburo
16

Standing Committee with military experience.

In “China’s New High Command”,

David Shambaugh states, “the military played no apparent role in the civilian leadership
succession before or at the 16^ Congress and vice versa—^that is, the civilian party
leaders played no apparent role in the selection of new military leadership.(Shambaugh,
“China’s New High Command”)” Twenty years ago, this sort of bifurcation of leadership
was unthinkable. Yet now,the PLA is now almost exclusively concerned with military
affairs, leaving domestic politics to civilian leadership. As noted by Ellis Joffe, there
currently exists a sort of conditional compliance ofthe military to the central
17

government.

The military allows itself to be subservient in name to the party, and

leadership within the CMC defers major policy-making decisions to leaders within the
military (Shambaugh,“Pinnacle of the Pyramid” 100).
In addition to the bifurcation of leadership in the Chinese government, military
training has also become more professionalized. Instead of learning communist doctrine,
military officers now spend their time learning the intricacies of military doctrine and
strategy and tactics. The role of political ideology within the military has virtually

16

There are two members ofthe Politburo with a high level of military experience(Guo
Boxiong and Xu Caihou), but they are not on the significantly more important Politburo
Standing Committee.
17
For more on conditional compliance, see James Mulvenon’s “China: Conditional
Compliance”
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disappeared, and political work has decreased significantly.

This shows that the party

has removed itself from this area, thus delegating responsibility for military training to
the military.
Negative Consequences of the Military Reforms
The military has made significant strides in regard to modernization, yet the
methods used to bring about decentralization have created problems among the military.
the party, and the state. The most important of these problems are the unclear chain of
command,the partial loss of civilian control over the military, and the PLA continued
presence within politics in China.
Unclear Chain of Command
Due to the informal nature of delegative decentralization and the informal
methods used to ensure civilian leadership, there is not a clear chain of command
between the civilian leadership and the military. Although Hu Jintao holds both the
position of president of the PRC and chairman ofthe CMC,there is no law that ensures
the relationship between these two positions. Although the CMC technically reports to
the Politburo Standing Committee,the Chairman is not directly responsible to anyone.
The shortcomings of the current system were particularly apparent during the transition
of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao in 2002. Although former President Jiang
Zemin relinquished his position as the leader of both the state and the party, he did not
relinquish his position on the Central Military Commission. When Hu took Jiang’s place
on the commission, he did not instantly gain ultimate authority over the military officers.
Most of the officers that were on this leadership council came to power during Jiang’s

18

For further explanation of political work in the PLA see David Shambaugh,“CivilMilitary Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military”
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term as president, and they had built a very close relationship with him. Because he did
not have personal credibility through military experience or close relationships with the
military leadership, Hu’s influence within the military was significantly less than that of
his predecessors. During the first year of Hu Jintao’s term as the leader of China,
military leaders continued to pledge “absolute” loyalty to Jiang as the chair ofthe CMC
rather than Hu as the leader of the state and the party (Mulvenon,“Two Centers” 16).
This situation presented a unique problem for the military. Because Jiang did not
concurrently hold any other positions other than chair ofthe CMC,the military did not
have direct representation on the Politburo Standing Committee. This also created a
significant conflict of power between Jiang and Hu. One military officer described the
difficulties that occurred due to this unclear line of leadership by saying,“many centers
mean no center, which will lead to no achievement(Mulvenon,“Two Centers” 35).” Hu
gained more power over the military during the SARS and Ming #361 crises than he did
when he took power as the President of the PRC. Ultimately, Jiang stepped down as the
leader of the CMC and Hu successfully followed him in this position, yet the Chinese
government has yet to resolve this problem. Although Chinese leadership has been able
to limit the negative effects of this unclear chain of command to date, it could produce
problems in the future.
Loss of Military Control
One common misconception about the Chinese party-military relationship is that
19

civilian control of the military is firmly entrenched.

Due to the lack of

19

According to Andrew Scobell in “Creeping Guojiahua"\ “Widespread agreement exists
in China today that civilian control of the armed forces is a fundamental principle of
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institutionalization, there perhaps is no way for party leaders to regain the authority they
relinquished to the military through decentralization. In this sense, the decentralization
has reached a point of no return. There is little doubt that the PLA will follow the CCP’s
leadership in response to external threats, but there is no consensus whether the military
will once again assist in restoring order during civic unrest. As David Shambaugh notes,
the PLA has responded and generally followed CCP orders in the past, but it required
both political and military elites with considerable stature to ensure their enforcement
(Shambaugh,“China’s Military in Transition” 12). As the military continues to gain
relative autonomy and leadership between the military and the party continues to split,
will civilian leaders be able to rely on military compliance with CCP policy? Because
there has been a major conflict of interest between party and military leaders, it is
difficult to answer this question. Only when the military chooses to preserve the party’s
interest over its own will we truly know the strength of the party-military relationship.
Chinese scholars may soon have their answer to the crucial question of military
compliance to the party’s leadership. The party-military relationship is currently being
tested in Tibet, where the party is relying on the military to control political dissidents.
Although this situation should present scholars with a look into the current party-military
relationship, it could be years(if ever) before information on the decision-making that is
currently taking place by both party and military leadership will be disseminated.
Is there a need for this lack of political institutionalization? Although the “fourth
generation” of leaders within the Communist Party consists of technocrats without
military experience, the current generation of military leaders does not possess the same

governance, yet the reality is that there is no concrete, institutionalized mechanism in
place to ensure it.” 228.
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level of political capital as their predecessors. Therefore, the military’s capacity to
intervene in the policy process has been significantly reduced (Mulvenon,“Two Centers'
13). This could give the civilian government an opportunity to set the legal framework
for civilian control over the military without fear of insubordination from the military.
Military Within Politics
Although communist doctrine no longer guides day-to-day activities, the military
has yet to remove itself fully from politics. As seen in Figure 4.1 on the next page, the
military retains a significant presence within the CCP Central Committee. Although the
military’s presence on the CCP Central Committee is near an all-time low, it still
maintains nearly 20 percent of representation. The PLA also continues to play a role in
the political process, particularly in lobbying. This lobbying consists of talking to the
national media on military related subjects (particularly the defense budget) and building
close relationships with politicians.
Although the military does not have official representation on the Politburo
Standing Committee, it still maintains significant influence through high-ranking military
officials regularly attending meetings of this important committee.^® Although these
military officials have no vote, their presence ensures that their voice is heard. The
military also still maintains a significant presence within the NPC. Currently, they hold
nearly 10 percent of the seats on the NPC. Therefore, the organization charged with
overseeing the military is partially controlled by the military, thus limiting civilian
oversight of the military.

20

For an extended analysis of PLA lobbying, see John Carver,“The PLA as an interest
group in Chinese foreign policy,” in Weisenbaum, Chinese Military Modernization.
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Figure 4.1
th
PLA Representation on the CCP Central Committee, 8*** Party Congress to 16
Party Congress

Source: David Shambaugh,“China’s New High Command”

Although the military does not have official representation on the Politburo
Standing Committee, it still maintains significant influence through high-ranking military
officials regularly attending meetings of this important committee?* Although these
military officials have no vote, their presence ensures that their voice is heard. The
military also still maintains a significant presence within the NPC. Currently, they hold
nearly 10 percent of the seats on the NPC. Therefore, the organization charged with
overseeing the military is partially controlled by the military, thus limiting civilian
oversight of the military.
Although the military still maintains a considerable presence in the central
government, it may be losing its influence. The military currently has to compete for
21

For an extended analysis ofPLA lobbying, see John Carver,“The PLA as an interest
group in Chinese foreign policy,” in Weisenbaum, Chinese Military Modernization.
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funds against economic construction projects and various social welfare projects. Unlike
Jiang, Hu places a greater emphasis on these social welfare programs. As seen in Figure
4.2, the percentage of the central government spending that the military receives has been
22

Steadily decreasing since Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978.

The future of

modernization in the PLA could depend on the military’s ability to effectively lobby
civilian leaders for funds.
Currently, there is only one civilian member on the CMC(Hu Jintao), and there
are no members of the Politburo Standing Committee who have military experience. Due
to the lack of institutionalization, the Chinese military is run almost entirely by military'
leaders
Figure 4.2
Military Expenditure as a Percentage of Central Government Spending, 1978-2003
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This graph is based on statistics provided by the Chinese government. Therefore, it is
difficult to truly determine the exact amount of money allotted to the military each year.
Many Chinese scholars believe that the amount allowed to the military is often as much
as twice as much as the official budget portrays.
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rather than civilians. Although civilian leaders have maintained control of the CMC to
date, the unclear chain of command between the CCP and the PLA could present
problems the for
the Chinese civilian leadership if a significant rift occurs between party and military
leadership, rendering the CCP unable to control the military.
Overview
The military has made significant strides with modernization, and the party has
continued to secure civilian control over the military through decentralization. Although
decentralization has been successful in several aspects of the party-military relationship,
the lack of institutionalization has led to many of the problems that currently plague the
party-military relationship. While on the surface these reforms are a step towards
institutionalization, they have not been complete enough to ensure civilian control over
the military. Based on the issues the party-military relationship has already faced, the
lack of institutionalization of the party-military reforms could ultimately lead to
significant problems between the party and the military. In the conclusion, I will discuss
the implications that the problems of decentralization could present for the CCP in the
future.
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Conclusion
As can be seen in this thesis, China has undergone substantial military reforms
over the past two decades. The military reforms enacted since Jiang Zemin came to
power have focused on delegating administrative and fiscal authority to the military, and
they have been very successful in increasing the efficiency and stability of the military.
Although the party has continued to relinquish decision-making authority to the military,
this has not led to the party losing, or even loosening, its control over the military. The
party has continued to maintain a high level of oversight through the informal methods
listed in the third chapter. While the government has been delegating decision-making
authority to the military’s leadership, it has strengthened and even created methods of
ensuring control by the central government. The party has also relied on informal rather
than highly institutionalized methods to ensure the military’s subordination to the party,
which gives the party the ability to regain the authority it has relinquished to the military.
This makes the party-military reforms very similar to delegative decentralization, where
subnational entities gain administrative and fiscal autonomy while the central government
maintains a high level of oversight. In this way,these military reforms fit within the
overall adaptive strategy of decentralization that the CCP has followed over the past three
decades rather than, as current literature suggests, being limited to the party-military
relationship.
Party-Military Relationship as Decentralization
Examining the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization can allow us to
better understeind the risks and rewards of the current party-military relationship.
Decentralization, when effectively instituted, can yield significant benefits such as
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allowing highly informed leadership at subnational levels to make policy decisions that
reflect the goals of the central government and the challenges presented at the local level.
Decentralization, when it is poorly instituted, can also bring negative consequences.
When there is no effective method of oversight by the central government, leaders at the
subnational level may begin to make policy decisions that are beneficial on the local level
yet not beneficial to the central government. This can lead to a “Dukedom economy”
where local governments sacrifice the goals ofthe central government in favor of local
economic growth. This can lead to subnational entities and the central government
working against each other rather than working together. This “Dukedom economy”
could be extremely detrimental to the national economy. If military leaders were to make
decisions based on “dukedom economy” ideology, it could not only affect the stability of
the ruling party but also affect the stability of East Asia.
This failure of decentralization could have significant negative consequences on
the party-military relationship. Currently, the military’s goals include maintaining CCP
leadership and protecting China’s economic interests(Mulvenon et al 6). If the party
does not maintain civilian control over the military, military leadership may begin to
pursue goals that would detrimental to the CCP’s overall strategy. For example, ifthe
PLA was to force Taiwan to reunify with mainland(a goal of many in the current military
leadership), this could significantly affect China’s political and economic stability. Such
an action could destabilize East Asia and bring condemnation and trade penalties from
many of China’s important trade partners. This would work against the overall goals of
the party, and it could even work undermine the party’s control of the government.
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In addition to problems with decentralization, China may also have a difficult
time maintaining civilian control over the military. Although the informal method of
decentralization has been successful to date, it has occurred at a time ofrelative domestic
and international stability. Will these reforms continue to be successful as China
continues to adapt to the ever-changing international political scene? Also, would these
informal methods of ensuring civilian control over the military withstand a large conflict
within the PLA or the CCP? Finally, if the Chinese enter into a military conflict, will the
PLA leadership continue to follow and be restrained to the leadership ofthe CCP?
Because of the level of stability in China during the past two decades, it is difficult to
predict whether military insubordination to the party and the state would occur. It is also
difficult, however, to ensure the military’s subordination to the civilian government. The
Chinese government should continue to institutionalize civilian control over the military
in order to limit conflicts between party and military leadership in future times of crisis.
Delegative Decentralization?
In the second chapter, I presented three different types of decentralization.
Although the type of decentralization utilized in the party-military relationship is similar
to delegative decentralization, it does have striking differences. First and foremost, fiscal
and administrative authority was delegated to a governmental entity rather than a local
government. Second,this form of decentralization lacks legislative framework. The
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Chinese government has, in a very practical way, applied the principles of
decentralization in an unconventional method. In this way, it is incorrect to classify this
type of decentralization as “delegation.” The best way to describe this method of
decentralization is “delegation with Chinese characteristics.”
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As can be seen in the transformation of the party-military relationship, the CCP is
a highly adaptive organization that has continually undergone transformation throughout
its lifetime. Regardless of whether they are regarding the economy of the military, we
will continue to see the CCP continue reforms throughout the government. As the
government continues to adapt, we will certainly continue to see military reforms with
Chinese characteristics.
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Table 5.0

General Secretary

Central Committee
Politburo Standing Committee

National Congress of the
Communist Party of
China

Politburo

Central Discipline
Inspection Committee

Source: Translated by author from news.sina.com.cn

Centrai Military Commission

Secretariat
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